Tomasz Herok: Intuitions as evidence: Linguistics vs philosophy

Zveme všechny zájemce na přednášku Intuitions as evidence: Linguistics vs philosophy Tomasze Heroka z Lancaster University, která se uskuteční v pondělí 4. 11. 2024  ve 14.00 v učebně D31.

Abstrakt:
According to Noam Chomsky, if a grammar is descriptively adequate, then “the structural descriptions assigned to sentences by the grammar, the distinctions that it makes between well-formed and deviant, and so on, must (...) correspond to the linguistic intuition of the native speaker”. According to a popular view in contemporary metaphilosophy, something similar is true of philosophical theories: they are considered adequate if they somehow correspond to our intuitions about what counts as knowledge, meaning, causation, explanation, justice etc. I am going to argue that this analogy does not make much sense. Focusing on two alleged paradigm examples of appealing to intuition in philosophy – Edmund Gettier’s argument against the “justified true belief” theory of knowledge, and Hilary Putnam’s argument against semantic internalism – I will argue that intuitions about knowledge, meaning etc. are never appealed to in philosophy in the way that intuitions about grammatical correctness are appealed to in linguistics.